



PACE MUN 2025  
CONFLICTS TO CONSENSUS

# BACKGROUND GUIDE

COMMITTEE: UNODC

AGENDA: COUNTERING THE GLOBAL SURGE  
OF ILLICIT FENTANYL AND SYNTHETIC DRUGS  
THROUGH ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL  
COOPERATION



## **LETTER FROM THE CHAIRS**

Esteemed Delegates,

It is with tremendous honour and a profound sense of urgency that we welcome you to this crucial session of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Our agenda, "Countering the Global Surge of Illicit Fentanyl and Synthetic Drugs Through Enhanced International Cooperation," addresses what has become the most lethal and rapidly evolving drug crisis in modern history.

The global proliferation of highly potent synthetic opioids, primarily fentanyl and its analogues, represents an unprecedented challenge. These substances, cheaply produced and easily concealed, have outpaced traditional drug control mechanisms and caused catastrophic loss of life across many regions. This crisis demands a decisive shift in how the international community approaches drug control, moving beyond conventional methods to embrace a dynamic, multi-lateral, and science-driven approach.

We recognize the complexity inherent in finding common ground when addressing issues that touch upon national sovereignty, economic policy, and public health philosophy. However, the unique mandate of the UNODC and the shared threat posed by synthetic drugs necessitate that we work past divisions.

We trust that you will approach the next few days with the diligence and innovative spirit required to craft a global strategy equal to the magnitude of this threat. We are eager to facilitate a fruitful and substantive debate that translates into life-saving action.

Warm Regards,  
Amritesh Banerjee



## **INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMITTEE**

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), established in 1997, serves as the cornerstone of the United Nations' coordinated global response to the threats of illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, and terrorism. It is the custodian of the three principal International Drug Control Conventions, providing the essential legal, research, and technical framework for Member States to implement their treaty obligations.

### **I. Core Purpose and Foundational Legal Mandate**

The UNODC's mission is to safeguard global peace, security, and human rights by making the world safer from crime and drugs. Its work is governed by a mandate derived from the following conventions, which together form the international drug control regime:

- **The Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 (and 1972 Protocol):** Controls plant-based drugs (like opium and coca) and key synthetic opioids like fentanyl itself (which was scheduled in **1964**).
- **The Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971:** Controls synthetic hallucinogens and stimulants.
- **The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (The Precursor Convention):** This is the most crucial instrument for the current crisis, as it provides the legal framework for international cooperation and control over the essential chemicals—precursors—used in illicit drug manufacture.

### **II. The Powers and Functions: A System of Technical and Normative Influence**

As a technical assistance and secretariat body, the UNODC does not possess the power of direct enforcement. Its authority rests instead on its normative power (setting global standards) and its technical power (building capacity).

#### **A. Normative Power: The Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND)**

The CND, the UNODC's governing body, has the sole authority to amend the schedules of controlled substances under the UN Conventions. This is the global legislative mechanism for drug control:

- **International Scheduling:** This power is essential for combating the "molecular modification" problem. When TCOs create a new fentanyl analogue (a new psychoactive substance, or NPS), the UNODC's Early Warning Advisory (EWA) system collects data, which is then reviewed by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). The CND then votes on whether to place the new substance—or its specific precursors—under international control (e.g., adding it to Table I of the 1988 Convention).
- **The Precursor Loophole:** Despite this power, the speed of illicit synthesis often outpaces the legal scheduling process. TCOs exploit the lag time, shifting from internationally controlled precursors (like NPP and ANPP) to non-scheduled "pre-precursors" or "designer precursors" that are one or two chemical steps removed from the final product. Your challenge is to develop a faster, more flexible approach to precursor control within the framework of the 1988 Convention.

## **B. Technical and Operational Power: Tools for Implementation**

The UNODC's key role is to equip Member States with the tools to implement CND mandates and disrupt the flow of synthetic drugs:

1. **Forensic and Scientific Analysis:** UNODC maintains the Global SMART Programme and provides technical assistance and equipment to national forensic laboratories. This capacity is vital for identifying new and emerging synthetic substances, providing the scientific evidence needed for the CND's scheduling decisions.
2. **Intelligence Sharing:** The UNODC operates secure communication systems used by global enforcement agencies:
  - **PEN Online:** The Pre-Export Notification (PEN) system, managed by the INCB, allows countries to verify the legitimacy of controlled precursor chemical shipments before they are exported, serving as a critical checkpoint to prevent diversion from the legal trade.
  - **PICS:** The Precursor Incident Communication System, which is an intelligence-sharing platform used to exchange real-time

information on specific incidents of diversion or trafficking.

3. **Capacity Building:** Through programs like the Container Control Programme (CCP), the UNODC trains customs and port control officers to identify and interdict hidden chemical precursors and illicit synthetic drugs concealed in shipping containers or international mail and express cargo—the primary vector for fentanyl trafficking.

**In essence, the UNODC functions as the nerve center for global drug policy, translating political will into scientific control and operational action.** The success of this committee hinges on your ability to use the framework of the existing conventions to forge novel, flexible, and fully funded cooperative mechanisms to address a threat that respects no borders.



## **A DELVE INTO THE AGENDA:**

### **I. Agenda Summary and Key Subtopics**

The central focus of this session is the proliferation of Illicitly Manufactured Fentanyl (IMF) and other New Psychoactive Substances (NPS), which represent an existential threat to the global drug control regime. This crisis is defined by a shift from bulky, plant-based drug supply chains to nimble, chemistry-driven, and high-potency synthetic production.

The comprehensive response required by this agenda is naturally divided into three interconnected areas of focus:

1. **Adapting the Precursor Chemical Control Regime:** This subtopic directly addresses the challenge of circumventing the international legal framework, specifically the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. The core issue is the molecular modification problem, where criminal syndicates exploit the speed of synthetic chemistry to use non-controlled pre-precursors and designer precursors as substitutes for scheduled chemicals. Delegates must formulate strategies to preemptively close this legislative loophole.
2. **Disrupting Transnational Synthetic Drug Supply Chains:** This focuses on the logistics of trafficking. IMF and other synthetic drugs are trafficked in small, highly concentrated volumes through global express mail, air cargo, and darknet transactions, making traditional border and large-container inspection methods less effective. Solutions must involve enhanced real-time intelligence sharing and advanced cooperation with private sector entities, such as chemical manufacturers, shipping companies, and technology firms.
3. **Integrating Public Health and Supply Reduction Approaches:** While supply reduction is crucial, the high lethality of synthetic opioids demands a robust health-focused response. The focus here is on ensuring that enforcement efforts are balanced by prevention, treatment, and immediate overdose intervention, particularly expanding access to Naloxone while maintaining legitimate medical access to controlled opioids for pain management.

## **II. Historical Background: The Evolution of the Crisis**

The current fentanyl crisis did not emerge in a vacuum; it is the culmination of three distinct but interconnected waves of the opioid epidemic:

- **Wave 1 (1990s): The Pharmaceutical Opioid Epidemic.** Driven by aggressive marketing and relaxed prescribing standards, pharmaceutical opioids like OxyContin were widely prescribed for non-cancer related chronic pain, leading to mass dependence and the subsequent diversion of these drugs into illicit use. This established a large user base ready to transition to cheaper alternatives.
- **Wave 2 (Early 2010s): The Shift to Heroin.** Following efforts to curb prescription drug diversion (e.g., reformulation of OxyContin in 2010), dependent users migrated to heroin, which was often more available and less expensive. This shift was marked by an increase in overdose deaths related to traditional opioids and a tightening of the illicit supply chain.
- **Wave 3 (2013-Present): The Fentanyl Crisis.** Beginning around 2013, illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF)—first synthesized in the 1960s—and its analogues rapidly infiltrated and then dominated the illicit drug market. Fentanyl's high potency (up to 50 times that of heroin) allows it to be manufactured cheaply in clandestine laboratories anywhere in the world and transported in tiny, easily concealed quantities. This change marks a fundamental shift from agricultural commodities (poppy fields) to industrial chemistry, dramatically accelerating the lethality and complexity of the drug problem.

## **III. The Current Situation: The Scale and Challenge of Chemical Agility**

The present-day challenge is defined by the high agility and near-limitless adaptability of the illicit synthetic drug market, creating an uphill battle for international control:

- **Lethality and Overdose Rates:** IMF and its ultra-potent analogues (like Carfentanil) are the primary drivers of record-high drug overdose fatalities, particularly in North America, but with



increasing threats emerging in Europe, Africa, and Asia.

- **The Problem of Molecular Variation:** The chemical structure of fentanyl is a piperidine-based molecule, and through slight alterations, criminal chemists can create scores of new analogues (e.g., Fluorofentanyl, Acetylfentanyl) that have similar pharmacological effects but are not yet controlled under international law. UNODC's Early Warning Advisory (EWA) tracks this emergence, but the legal scheduling process often takes over a year to implement, a period during which TCOs have already switched to the next unscheduled compound.
- **The Precursor Evasion Loophole (A Mathematical Analogy):** The 1988 Convention is designed for a scenario where there is a limited set of essential chemicals (precursors) required for production. However, in synthetic chemistry, if the final step uses a controlled precursor (Chemical A), producers simply move two steps back to an uncontrolled pre-precursor (Chemical Z). The mathematical reality is that for every controlled chemical, there may be dozens of technically viable, legally traded substitute pre-precursors. Therefore, effective control requires innovative legislative mechanisms, such as class-wide controls, to govern entire families of chemical structures, rather than controlling them one by one.
- **Disrupting Logistics:** The shift to small-volume, high-value trafficking has strained international collaboration tools. The sheer volume of global mail and package delivery makes it logistically and financially unfeasible for customs agencies to inspect every package for milligram-quantities of fentanyl. Solutions must move toward targeted intelligence, public-private partnerships, and technological solutions to identify high-risk shipments.



## **PAST ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE COMMITTEE**

The inadequacy of the legally binding conventions (1961, 1971, and 1988) to keep pace with synthetic drug evolution has compelled the international community to develop a parallel set of non-treaty operational mechanisms. These mechanisms, largely driven by the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) and the INCB (International Narcotics Control Board), form the core of the proposed "enhanced international cooperation" to address the synthetic drug crisis.

Here are the key theoretical pillars and practical tools designed to bridge the regulatory gaps:

### **I. The Policy Pillar: Fast-Track Information and Alert Systems**

To combat the "scheduling lag," the focus has shifted from slow legal control to rapid information sharing:

#### **1. UNODC Early Warning Advisory (EWA) on NPS:**

- **Goal:** To mitigate the threat posed by New Psychoactive Substances (NPS)—substances not yet under international control.
- **Mechanism:** The EWA acts as a global monitoring and knowledge hub, collecting data on emerging substances, their chemical structures (e.g., fentanyl analogues), patterns of use, and potential public health threats. It issues alerts to Member States and the WHO-ECDD, effectively shortening the time between a new substance appearing on the illicit market and its formal assessment for scheduling.
- **Theoretical Significance:** It represents a shift from a *reactive, criminal-justice focus* to a *proactive, public-health informed early warning system*. It ensures that decisions (both international scheduling and national controls) are based on the latest scientific and toxicity evidence, not just anecdotal seizures.

#### **2. INCB Project ION and IONICS:**

- **Project ION (International Operations on NPS):** This is the INCB's operational initiative focused specifically on non-scheduled NPS. It supports national authorities by coordinating the collection and communication of strategic

and operational intelligence.

- **IONICS (ION Incident Communication System):** This is a secure, real-time platform for national authorities to exchange information on incidents involving suspicious shipments, illicit manufacture, or seizures of NPS.
- **Theoretical Significance:** This creates a voluntary, real-time intelligence network that bypasses the formal, time-consuming diplomatic channels. It allows law enforcement to act on a substance *before* it is formally scheduled under the 1961 or 1971 Conventions, treating it as a police or customs matter rather than a full legal scheduling case.

## **II. The Precursor Pillar: Voluntary Control of Non-Scheduled Chemicals**

To counter the "pre-precursor and designer precursor loophole" in the 1988 Convention, the strategy relies on voluntary industry-government partnerships and surveillance:

### **1. INCB Project Prism:**

- **Goal:** To prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals used in the illicit manufacture of synthetic drugs (including Amphetamine-Type Stimulants and synthetic opioids like fentanyl).
- **Mechanism:** It provides a framework for international cooperation, coordinating time-bound special operations and issuing Special Alerts to participating governments and industry. It focuses on precursor chemicals listed in Table I and II, as well as emerging, non-scheduled precursors of concern.
- **Theoretical Significance:** It operationalizes the cooperation mandated by the 1988 Convention, extending surveillance beyond simple paperwork review into proactive, intelligence-led enforcement.

### **2. INCB PEN Online Light System:**

- **Goal:** To address the use of internationally non-scheduled chemicals (e.g., designer precursors and pre-precursors) that fall outside the mandatory control of the 1988 Convention's



Tables I and II.

- **Mechanism:** This system allows exporting and importing countries to voluntarily exchange Pre-Export Notifications (PENs) for substitute or alternative chemicals that are known to be used in illicit drug manufacture (often those on the INCB's Limited International Special Surveillance List (ISSL)).
- **Theoretical Significance:** This is arguably the most critical innovative mechanism. It creates a voluntary surveillance regime that extends the net of precursor control without requiring an amendment to the 1988 Convention or burdening the licit trade of common chemicals. It relies on the *good faith* of Member States and a common operational necessity to police the pre-precursor market.

## **THINGS TO RESEARCH ABOUT**

1. **Addressing the Proactive Scheduling Dilemma:** Given the CND's encouragement of "proactive scheduling" for designer precursors, what are the theoretical due process and rule of law arguments against controlling a substance (or a chemical group) *before* it has been seized, sold, or demonstrably diverted in illicit manufacture, and how can the principle of precaution be reconciled with the need for due process?
2. **Sovereignty vs. Surveillance in Voluntary Systems:** What is the theoretical compliance and enforcement mechanism for systems like PEN Online Light and the INCB's ISSL (International Special Surveillance List) when participation is voluntary? How does a Member State conceptually balance its sovereign right to privacy over non-controlled chemical trade with the collective responsibility to close international security gaps?
3. **The Ethics of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP):** When the control of non-scheduled pre-precursors relies on voluntary agreements and data sharing with the global chemical industry, what theoretical framework protects the industry from over-regulation or liability for dual-use chemicals, and what ethical concerns arise regarding private entities performing surveillance functions typically reserved for the state?
4. **Operationalizing the Global-to-Local Intelligence Loop:** In practical policy terms, what is the weakest link in the operational chain that converts a raw seizure notification from a low-capacity country via the UNODC EWA into a legally binding international decision at the CND? Which UN body is theoretically responsible for financing the full transition of intelligence data into formal scientific evidence suitable for WHO review?
5. **The Small Shipment Problem and UPU Integrity:** From a policy perspective, how can Member States effectively leverage advanced data analytics (e.g., API/AI tools) to detect illicit synthetic drug shipments in the vast volume of international mail without violating the core Universal Postal Union (UPU) treaty obligations of mail secrecy and the efficiency of global commerce?



6. **The Definitional Challenge of the NPS:** The definition of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) explicitly excludes substances under the 1961/1971 Conventions. As more fentanyl analogues and synthetic cathinones are scheduled, what are the theoretical risks of the EWA continually narrowing its focus, and how does this affect the long-term viability of the NPS framework when the chemical evolution is faster than the scheduling process?
7. **Strengthening the 1988 Convention's Adaptability:** Since the 1988 Convention is repeatedly shown to be slow in adding new precursors, what are the theoretical merits and drawbacks of proposing a new protocol to the Convention that would allow for the temporary, emergency scheduling of designer precursors (on an analogue basis) with a lower burden of proof, subject to future ratification?

## **QUESTIONS A RESOLUTION SHOULD ADDRESS**

### **1. Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Soft Law Mechanisms:**

How can the international community establish a formalized, standardized, and sustained mechanism for accountability and review over non-treaty, voluntary cooperation tools (e.g., INCB's PEN Online Light, ISSL) without infringing on state sovereignty, and what specific incentives or disincentives (beyond technical assistance) should a resolution propose to ensure Member States consistently and reliably report suspicious transactions of non-scheduled chemicals?

- *(The resolution must move beyond merely "encouraging" cooperation to proposing a clear, institutionalized compliance pathway for soft law.)*

### **2. Creating a Sustainable Financial and Capacity Model for Remediation:**

How can a resolution establish a dedicated, multi-year, and predictable funding source (e.g., a "Synthetic Drug Cleanup Fund" drawing from seized illicit assets or a mandatory assessed contribution model) to cover the enormous and growing costs of specialized training, equipment, and the environmentally sound disposal of seized synthetic drugs, precursors, and highly toxic clandestine laboratory waste, particularly in low-capacity and transit countries?

- *(The resolution must solve the critical resource problem for the physical cleanup and safety aspects of the synthetic drug trade, which currently relies too heavily on voluntary, ad-hoc funding.)*

### **3. Integrating Public Health Mandates into Supply Control Operations:**

How can a final resolution structurally ensure that every enhanced supply reduction mechanism (e.g., a new precursor alert system) is mandated to include an immediate, corresponding public health response component (e.g., simultaneous early warning to public health agencies and mandatory data collection on toxicity/abuse potential) to uphold the dual mandate of the UN Conventions and prevent a rapid law enforcement response from compromising humanitarian or medical access to essential controlled substances?

- *(The resolution must formalize the link between supply*



*reduction and public health, ensuring that rapid control actions do not inadvertently worsen the treatment and access gap for related medical substances.)*

## **BIBLIOGRAPHY**

1. **Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961 (as amended by 1972 Protocol):**
  - **Link:**  
[https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention\\_1961\\_en.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1961_en.pdf)
  - *Significance:* Establishes the core control mechanism (licensing, estimates, statistical reporting) for traditional plant-based narcotics (e.g., opium, cocaine, cannabis).
2. **Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971:**
  - **Link:**  
[https://www.incb.org/documents/Psychotropics/conventions/convention\\_1971\\_en.pdf](https://www.incb.org/documents/Psychotropics/conventions/convention_1971_en.pdf)
  - *Significance:* Extends control to synthetic substances (e.g., amphetamines, LSD, benzodiazepines) and introduces flexible scheduling for rapidly evolving compounds.
3. **UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (The "Precursor" Convention):**
  - **Link:**  
<https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201582/volume-1582-i-27627-english.pdf>
  - *Significance:* Focuses on international crime-fighting, money laundering, and, critically, the control of precursor chemicals (the raw ingredients for synthetic drugs, a key area for algorithmic control).
4. **INCB Precursors Report 2024 (Article 12 Report):**
  - **Link:**  
[https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL\\_REPORTS/2024/E/PRE\\_Report\\_E.pdf](https://www.incb.org/documents/PRECURSORS/TECHNICAL_REPORTS/2024/E/PRE_Report_E.pdf)
  - *Significance:* The *most relevant* report for analyzing the control of precursor chemicals, providing detailed seizures data, chemical diversion trends, and the functioning of the PEN Online system (the algorithmic core of precursor monitoring).





# GOOD LUCK DELEGATE!

See you at the Conference!

